Although a conceptual distinction can be made between “nature” and “grace”, grace cannot be considered in an extrinsic way or as something added to human nature. Grace, on the other hand, cannot be reified or “naturalized.” On the historical level, man did not begin to exist as a “pure human nature”, but as a “graceful” nature (ordered to grace) by the free will of God. The problem arises when trying to reconcile the supposed “pure nature” of man with the ordination to grace (supernatural), so that grace does not lose its character as an improper gift.

Man, according to the theologian Karl Rahner S.J. (1904-1984), has an unconditional ordination to grace by virtue of his nature as such. It would be necessary to see if this is reconcilable with the axiom that “grace is absolutely undue.” What God disposes for man must be an internal ontological constituent of his concrete essence, even if it is not of his nature. “If God gives to creation, and above all to man, a supernatural end, and this is the first in intentione, then the world and man eo ipso, always and everywhere, in their internal structure, are different from what they would be if they did not possess that end, even before having achieved it partially (justifying grace) or totally (vision of God) [Rahner, K. (1967). Theological writings. Vol. I, 3rd. Ed. Madrid: Taurus, p. 333).

Rahner criticizes the position put forward by a new theological current expressed under the name of novelle théologie (the “new theology”). Said school intends to prove that there is no incompatibility in affirming that there is an unconditional ordination of man to grace, to the beatific vision, which is a constitutive of the very nature of man and at the same time an undue gift to man. In this conception – criticizes Rahner – the gratuitousness of grace is seriously questioned. This new conception, Rahner points out, “considered the ordination to the beatific vision of God, on the one hand, as an internal constituent, impossible to lose, of human nature. And on the other, it declared the non-concession of the end of such ordination irreconcilable with the wisdom and goodness of God; and, in this sense, he conceived this ordination as unconditional, naturally, in the event that the creature did not lose that end through his own fault. We believe that in this case it is not possible to continue calling neither the grace nor the vision of God free” (Writings on Theology, Vol. I. O. Cit., p. 335).

The defenders of the “new theory” try to show that the absolute ordering of man’s nature, as such, to grace and its undue (supernatural) character are not mutually exclusive, but mutually conditioned. From the most intimate essence of grace, it follows rather, according to Rahner, “the impossibility of nature possessing a disposition towards it, or that this disposition, if necessary, itself belongs to the order of the supernatural. But what does not follow is that such provision, as natural, gives consistency to the gratuitousness of grace” (Ibid., O. Cit., p. 339). Once again, we are faced with the old problem of the relationship between nature and grace, which in the past led to endless theological discussions.

The way in which the “new theology” presents the dynamism of human nature, including in its essence the supernatural as an internal end, threatens – according to Rahner – the supernatural and undue nature of such an end. “The paradox of a natural desire for the supernatural as a link between nature and grace is conceivable and necessary, if desire is understood as an “opening” for the supernatural, and such an openness is taught by all Catholic theology, even if it is too often interpreted in a very formal and purely negative way as mere non-contradiction” (Ibid., pp. 340-341). But what is not reconcilable with the gratuity of grace – says Rahner – is to affirm a desire that is natural and at the same time, even if only objectively, inevitably attracts grace to itself, that is a desire that “demands” grace, and that demands it precisely because, otherwise, such a desire would make no sense.

How does Rahner conceive the relationship between man and grace? To understand Rahner’s position, we first have to clarify what he understands by supernatural existential and obedient power. The existential term, as a noun, “is everything that, as a condition, possibility and permanent and internal limit, precedes the free realization of the person, either because it is given by an essential structure of man, or because it precedes historically and contingently as something that internally affects the human substance, although it is not deducible from the essence” (Rahner, K. Escritos de Teología, Vol. I, O. Cit., p. 332, in note 4).

Rahner admits in man a “supernatural existential”, which consists in the “permanent orientation of man towards the beatific vision”. It is true, says Rahner, that the beatific vision is “supernatural” for man and that, consequently, he cannot be the object of an innate appetite. However, “in the historical man, incorporated into the current soteriological economy, a quality can be admitted that affects his substance (the supernatural existential), by which he truly “tends” towards his supernatural end. With this, the penalty of damages for the convicted can be better explained” (Ibid., p. 333).

The theologian — Rahner points out — must seriously ask himself in what way can the penalty of damage be explained, if such a permanent supernatural existential, previously ordered to grace, is not admitted; this, according to Rahner, is not possible. The loss of a possible good, but which is not the object of an ontological order, can only be felt as a painful evil if the person who loses it wants it freely. The decisive reason for admitting the existence of the “supernatural existential” is the ordination of man to the beatific vision. “The inevitable and obligatory ordination of man to a supernatural end, even prior to grace, is a real determination of man, and not just an intention, a decree “in the will” of God. Making of it a merely “legal”, merely “moral” entity, is a nominalism that does not understand itself” (Ibid., p. 344, in note 14).

Regarding the other important concept of Rahner, that of obedient power, this is understood as “opening of human nature to receive grace”, it is not only a non-contradiction, but an internal order. It is necessary, -Rahner points out-, that the spiritual nature possesses an opening towards the supernatural existential, without for that reason demanding it unconditionally for itself. “This opening cannot be thought merely as a non-contradiction, but as an internal ordering, always assumed as unconditional” (Ibid., p. 347).

Assuming these two fundamental concepts, that of “supernatural existential” and that of “obedient power”, Rahner interprets the relationships between nature and grace in the following way: “God wants to communicate himself, lavish love on him, who is himself. This is first and last in his real plans, and therefore in his real world. Everything else exists so that this can exist, which is the only thing: the eternal miracle of infinite love. God thus creates a being whom he can love in this way: man. He creates him so that man can accommodate this love that is God himself; that he can and has to receive it at the same time as what it is: the amazing miracle, the unexpected, improper gift” (Ibid., pp. 341-342).

Man, says Rahner, must be able to receive that love, which is God himself; he must possess a congeniality for that love. He must, then, have a real “potency” (capacity) for that love; and always have her, because that love speaks to her and always invites her. “Man, such as he is in fact, is created for him. He has been thought of and called into existence so that this love can be delivered. According to this, such a “power” is the most due and most authentic of him, the center and the radical reason for what he is” (Ibid., p. 342).

1. Rahner considers it necessary to maintain the hypothesis of a “pure nature” of man, which would be the result or “remainder” of what would remain if the “existential supernatural” were subtracted (undue gift); but, in historical reality, a man in a state of “pure nature” has never existed. On the other hand, “pure nature” is not something clearly definable, delimit able. No clear horizontal line can be drawn between nature and the supernatural. We have no experience of a “pure nature”; we cannot accurately say how a man would react in a state of “pure nature”. Man – says Rahner – can have an experience of himself only in the ambit of God’s supernatural loving will. In this sense, nature is always, conceptually, a remainder. But such a concept is necessary and is based on reality, if we want to conceive the improper character of grace, despite the interior, unconditional ordination of man towards it” (Ibid., p. 346).

Rahner seeks a compromise solution: to admit a “pure nature” and while grace takes root in nature. “Pure nature” is a “possibility”; but we don’t know what it is. Historical man has the natural appetite to see God, he has a positive openness towards grace (here he follows Father Henri-Marie Joseph Sonier de Lubac, S.J. (1896-1991); this historical man has a beginning of grace. Everything that historical man has is a gift from God. The difficulty of Rahner’s position is not between the relations of historical man with grace, but between the “natural order” and the “historical order”: how is the nature of historical man linked to ” pure nature?”